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ABSTRACT
This study examines a sample of 384 initial public offerings (IPOs) issued and listed on Bursa Malaysia from January 
1999 to December 2008. The objectives of this study are to examine the difference in initial returns of Shariah versus 
non-Shariah IPOs and the factors that explain the initial returns of these IPOs. A matched sample of Shariah IPOs, which 
contains the same number of IPOs and share similar characteristics with the non-Shariah IPOs, is created to ensure a 
more compatible comparison. The results of the difference tests consistently show that the initial returns of non-Shariah 
IPOs are not statistically different from those of all and matched sample of Shariah IPOs. The cross-sectional multiple 
regressions yield results demonstrating that Shariah and non-Shariah IPOs share only one common factor: allocation 
rate. Other than the sole common factor, the initial returns of non-Shariah IPOs are determined by external factors, 
namely the reputation of the underwriter and the condition of the market. On the contrary, the initial returns of the 
Shariah IPOs (all) depend on internal factors, namely the size of the offer; the age of the firm; and the ownership of the 
top five shareholders. As far as the result of the matched Shariah sample is concerned, none of the other variables are 
significant in explaining the initial returns.
Keywords: IPO initial return; Shariah IPOs; non-Shariah IPOs; allocation rate; growth motive
ABSTRAK
Kajian ini menguji satu sampel 384 saham tawaran awam awal (TAA) yang diterbitkan dan disenaraikan di Bursa Malaysia 
dari Januari 1999 hingga Disember 2008. Objektif kajian ini adalah untuk mengkaji pulangan awal saham TAA patuh 
Shariah berbanding yang tidak patuh Shariah dan juga faktor-faktor yang menjelaskan pulangan awal saham-saham 
TAA tersebut. Satu sampel padanan bagi saham TAA patuh Shariah yang mengandungi bilangan saham TAA yang sama 
dan mempunyai ciri-ciri yang sama dengan saham TAA tidak patuh Shariah dibentuk untuk memastikan perbandingan 
adalah lebih setara. Hasil ujian perbezaan secara konsisten menunjukkan pulangan awal saham tidak patuh Shariah 
secara statistik tidak berbeza dengan semua dan sampel padanan saham TAA patuh Shariah. Regresi berganda keratan 
rentas memperoleh hasil yang menunjukkan saham TAA patuh Shariah dan tidak patuh Shariah hanya mempunyai satu 
faktor lazim, iaitu kadar agihan. Selain faktor lazim tersebut, pulangan awal saham TAA tidak patuh Shariah ditentukan 
oleh faktor-faktor luaran iaitu reputasi penajajamin dan keadaan pasaran. Sebaliknya, pulangan awal saham TAA 
patuh Shariah (semua) bergantung kepada faktor-faktor dalaman iaitu saiz tawaran, umur syarikat, dan pemilikan lima 
pemegang saham terbesar. Manakala bagi sampel padanan saham TAA patuh Shariah pula, pulangan awalnya tidak 
dipengaruhi oleh mana-mana faktor tersebut.
Kata kunci: Pulangan awal saham TAA; saham TAA patuh Shariah; saham TAA tidak patuh Shariah; kadar agihan; motif 
pertumbuhan
INTRODUCTION
An initial public offering (IPO) is a major event for 
companies because it provides access to new external equity 
capital necessary for future growth; creates a secondary 
market to improve the liquidity of the shares;improves 
the visibility of the company in the market; allows firms 
to restructure to achieve the target capital structure; and 
creates an effective exit strategy for venture capitalists 
and/or original owners. Most studies (e.g., Loughran et al. 
1994; Reilly & Hatfield 1969; McDonald & Fisher 1972; 
Ibbotson & Jaffe 1975; Chowdhry& Sherman 1996) that 
examine IPOs focus on the puzzlingly abnormal initial 
returns that are realized by investors at the initial stage of 
the new shares listing. Also known as underpricing, the 
significantly abnormal initial return of IPOs occurs when 
the offer price is set much lower than the price on the first 
trading day or when the price on the first day of listing 
increases much higher than the offer price. 
Malaysian IPOs have received considerable attention 
from contemporary researchers (e.g., Dawson 1987; 
Yong 1991; Wu 1993; Ariff & Shamsher 1999; Jelic et al. 
2001; Abdullah & Mohd 2004; Yong 1991, 1997, 2007). 
Nevertheless, studies focusing on the Islamic segment of 
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IPO markets are still limited (Abdul-Rahim & Yong 2008, 
2010). The limited attention given to the Islamic segment 
of the IPO market continues despite the fact that worldwide, 
investors, regardless of religion or other beliefs, are 
increasingly concerned and demand investments that 
are Islamic, ethical, and/or socially responsible. In the 
context of the Malaysian equity market, Shariah-compliant 
status appears to be a major concern for the Securities 
Commission (SC) even though, in reality, Malaysian stock 
market players and public listed companies (PLC) owners 
are predominantly non-Muslim entities. In 2004, the SC 
introduced pre-IPO Shariah-compliant status, a policy that 
allows IPO issuers to leverage on Shariah-compliant status 
because their client base can be easily widened to include 
foreign Muslim investors, particularly from the rich 
Middle-East countries. In brief, this policy is consistent 
with the Malaysian vision tobe the international hub of 
theIslamic capital market.
The focus on Shariah-compliant status is also 
motivated by Moshirian et al. (2009), who, upon finding 
evidence of varying degree of abnormal performance of 
IPOs across countries in pan-Asian markets, attribute the 
variation to unique country-specific features. In the context 
of the Malaysian IPO market, one of its uniqueness is the 
Shariah status that some of its IPOs carry. The proposition 
that Shariah status possesses a certain degree of influence 
on the initial performance of an IPO initial performance is 
based upon the fact that in order to be awarded the Shariah 
compliance status, IPO issuers are required to undergo 
an additional screening process certifying whether the 
core business activities of the companies are permissible 
(halal) and ethical, while the portion of income that stems 
from prohibited activities and investments is kept within 
a reasonably tolerable level.
As shown in Figure 1, the majority of public listed 
companies (PLCs) in Bursa Malaysia are Shariah-compliant 
and the percentage continues to grow. The significance of 
Shariah-compliant status is that the status functions as a 
certification by the market regulator (i.e., the SC in the 
case of Malaysia)1 that companies that have undergone and 
passed the Shariah-compliant screening process generate 
their incomes from businesses that are free from prohibited 
(haram), unethical or socially irresponsible elements. 
The screening criteria of Shariah-compliant companies 
are comprehensive in the sense that the criteria examine 
companies forelements of certainty, integrity, justice and 
accountability in addition to the basic halal or haram rules. 
Details of the Shariah screening criteria are provided in 
the Appendix. Throughout the course of the present study, 
Shariah-compliant IPOs will be interchangeably referred 
to as Shariah IPOs, whereas IPOs that do not comply with 
the Shariah screening criteria are interchangeably referred 
to as non-Shariah or conventional IPOs.
FIGURE 1. Growth in the Islamic segment of the Malaysian equity market
1200
N
o.
 o
f C
ou
nt
er
s
90
Shariah/All (%)
1000 85
800
80
600
75
400
70
200
650
Shariah Counters
1999
544
745
73
604
789
77
638
807
79
684
868
79
722
889
81
787
947
83
857
1011
85
886
1029
86
853
991
86
855
980
87
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
All Counters
Shariah/All (%)
In a nutshell, the process of obtaining the Shariah-
compliant status creates a product differentiation between 
IPOs with Shariah-compliant status and those IPOs without 
the status. Accordingly, Shariah status is expected to 
create additional demand because, like other products 
or services, real or financial investments in entities with 
Shariah-compliant status are not only meant for the 
Muslim investors, but for all investors generally. Based 
upon this argument, the present study proposes that IPOs 
that carry Shariah-compliant status perform differently 
from those IPOs that without the status.
In explaining the anomalous initial return of IPOs, 
many studies forward arguments that revolve around 
information asymmetry and adverse selection between 
the issuers (insiders) and investors (outsiders). The 
present study also proposes that the initial returns of 
Shariah IPOs are influenced by factors that differ from 
those that influence the initial returns of their non-Shariah 
counterparts. In short, the present study expands upon the 
work pioneered by Abdul-Rahim and Yong (2008, 2010) 
by imposing a stricter rule for the comparison of the initial 
returns of Shariah and non-Shariah IPOs.
Chapter 4.indd   38 2/24/2014   3:53:41 PM
39Initial Returns of Shariah versus Non-Shariah IPOs: Are There Any Differences?
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. 
The next section reviews previous studies on IPO initial 
performance; the determinant factors of IPO initial 
performance; and the underlying theories of abnormal 
behavior in IPO markets. This is followed by a section 
describing the research methodology employed to test the 
hypotheses. The last two sections discuss the results; and 
conclude and explain the implications of the results.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The anomalous initial return of IPOs is widely accepted 
as a universal phenomenon. One of the most cited studies 
concerning IPO initial returns is the constantly updated 
study by Loughran et al. (1994)2, which finds that abnormal 
IPO initial returns exist in all 25 countries selected in the 
continuous study. The results are consistent with several 
other pioneer studies that investigate the initial returns 
of IPOs, including the examination of IPOs in the US by 
Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975); in the UK by Chowdhry and 
Sherman (1996); in Singapore by Lee et al. (1999); in 
Malaysia by Dawson (1987) and Yong (1991, 1997); and 
in Australia by Finn and Hingham (1988).
Despite the widely accepted anomaly of IPO 
initial returns, the causes and varying degrees of such 
anomaliescontinues to be the substance of debate around 
the world. One of the most widely cited theoretical 
explanations for the anomalous initial return phenomenon 
is the winner’s curse hypothesis (Rock 1986), which posits 
that adverse selection is the main problem that restrains 
uninformed investors from entering the IPO market. To 
ensure their IPOs are successful, issuers and underwriters 
must underprice the new issues to regain or attract 
the interest of uninformed investors in the IPOs. Other 
widely accepted theoretical explanations concerning the 
anomalous initial returns of IPOs include signaling models3 
(Leland & Pyle 1977); the faddish behavior of investors4 
(Aggarwal & Rivoli 1990); and cascades or bandwagon 
effects in the IPO market5 (Welch 1992). 
Moshirian et al. (2009) attribute the varying degree 
of initial returns across countries to the country-specific 
features. Documenting evidence on the performance of IPOs 
in pan-Asian markets between 1991 and 2004, the study 
finds that the initial returns of Malaysian IPOs (61.81%) 
exceeds those in developed Asian markets,including Hong 
Kong (21.43%), Japan (34.04%) and Singapore (33.10%). 
The Malaysian IPO market is known for its uniqueness, 
which includes the characteristics relating to Shariah status 
and ownership distribution of IPOs to Bumiputra6. Abdul-
Rahim and Yong (2008, 2010) examine the role of Shariah 
status and find that the status does not have a significant 
influence on the initial returns of IPOs in Malaysia. The 
results imply that, despite the emphasis and advantages 
offered by Shariah-compliant status, the status does not 
appear to contribute to a significant differential between 
the initial returns of IPOs issued by Shariah-compliant 
PLCs and the initial returns of IPOs issued by non-Shariah 
PLCs.
The findings by Abdul-Rahim and Yong (2008, 
2010) are paradoxical because, as explained in the earlier 
section, carrying a Shariah-compliant status means that 
the activities of company should be free from any form 
of prohibited elements, including riba or interest-based 
transactions; unethical elements; and doubtful transactions. 
In other words, passing the screening process should create 
a competitive advantage for the issuing companies, which, 
in turn, should create additional demand for Shariah IPOs. 
However, a flaw exists in the studies by Abdul-Rahim 
and Yong (2008, 2010) because comparisons between 
Shariah and non-Shariah IPOs are made without taking 
into consideration the difference in sample size and, more 
importantly, the differences in the characteristics of the 
two samples being compared.
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES OF IPO INITIAL PERFORMANCE
In examining the initial performance of Shariah versus non-
Shariah IPOs and the factors that explain the performance, 
the present study focuses on three factors that have 
been neglected or have not received enough attention in 
previous studies, despite the fact that information on most 
of these factors is disclosed in the prospectus. Recognizing 
the significance of such information may help investors to 
make informed decisions about IPOs. The three factors are 
allocation rate, operating risk and growth motive.
Allocation Rate Allocation rate provides an estimate of 
the probability that the investors’ subscription is successful 
based on the rate of IPOs allocated to them. Allocation rate 
is expected to have a negative relationship with initial 
returns because, when the probability for investors to win 
(get the allocation) is high, it demonstrates that the IPOs 
are not adequately subscribed (demanded) by informed 
investors. In other words, a low subscription due especially 
to reluctant participation from informed investors should 
be taken as a reliable indication that the IPOs are not likely 
to be of high quality, and, therefore, not likely to generate 
a high initial return. Amihud et al. (2003) argue that the 
relationship between the allocation rate to subscribers 
and the level of IPO initial returns reflects the existence of 
winner’s curse or adverse selection in the IPO market.
Growth Motive The present study also examines the 
motivation behind the issuers’decisions to issue IPOs by 
calculating the percentageof the proceeds from IPOs that is 
allocated for growth. The percentage of proceeds utilized 
for growth, or growth motive, is expected to send a signal 
about the future prospect of the companies. The importance 
of growth motive is documented in various studies that 
explore the issues of growth in IPOs (e.g., Chung et al. 
2005; Leone et al. 2007; Chahine et al. 2007). Chung 
et al. (2005) test the relationship between initial returns 
and growth opportunities and find that the relationship is 
consistently positive. Chahine et al. (2007) discover that 
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growth opportunities have a positive relationship with 
investment in R&D activities. This finding implies that if 
an insufficient amount of the IPO proceeds are allocated to 
finance growth, company growth will slow down which 
eventually results in decreases in the firms’ value. Leone 
et al. (2007) find that the relationships between R&D and 
growth opportunities vary due to differences in the national 
systems of corporate governance; and firm size.
Operating Risk One of the listing requirements of 
Bursa Malaysia mandates issuing firms to demonstrate a 
good track record of profitability. Zheng and Stangeland 
(2005) find that initial returns have a positive relationship 
with growth rates in sales and EBITDA (earnings before 
interest, taxes and depreciation). Meanwhile, Shen et al. 
(2008) discover the price of IPOs increases tremendously 
due to misperceptions concerning earnings and find that 
a positive relationship exists between initial returns and 
discretionary earnings. The present study uses the standard 
deviation of EBITDA prior to IPO to measure the operating 
risk of the issuing firms. Based upon the risk-return trade-
off theory, the higher the operating risk, the higher the 
initial returns.
Control Variables In addition to the three factors, the 
present study recognizes other factors that are found to 
be significant in explaining the initial returns of IPOs: the 
reputation of underwriters (Jelic et al. 2001; Abdullah 
& Mohd 2004); firm size (Abdul-Rahim & Yong 2008; 
Abdullah &Mohd 2004; Yong 1996, 2008); firm age 
(McDonald & Fisher 1972); offer size (Abdul-Rahim 
& Yong 2008, 2010);ownership of top 5 shareholders 
(Abdullah & Mohd 2004); and market conditions 
(Afirudin 2004; Ritter 1984).
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The present study employs a data set of fixed-priced 
IPOs issued from January 1999 until December 2008 and 
listed on either the Main Board, the Second Board or the 
MESDAQ of Bursa Malaysia (previously known as the 
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange). On 25 March 2008, the 
Main and Second Boards were merged to form the Main 
Market, while the MESDAQ was converted to the ACE 
market. The year 1999 is selected as the starting point 
to minimize the adverse effects of the 1997/98 Asian 
financial crisis on the analysis. Although similar effects 
are expected to be found during the 2007/08 US sub-prime 
crisis, the Malaysian market was not adversely affected 
to the extent that it was affected by the 1997/98 Asian 
financial crisis. As reported in Table 1, a total of 426 new 
issues are found during the 10-year study period. 
SAMPLE AND MATCHED SAMPLE
Similar to Abdul-Rahim and Yong (2008, 2010) and Yong 
(2007), the present study selects a sample of IPOs that are 
offered as public issue; offer for sale; private placement; 
and hybrid of the aforementioned forms. The selection 
criteria essentially exclude special purpose IPOs, such as 
restricted offers for sale; restricted public issues; restricted 
offers for sale to eligible employees; restricted offers for 
sale to Bumiputra investors; special and restricted issues 
to Bumiputra investors; tender offers; and special issues. 
Special purposes IPOs are rare and including them may 
lead to a less meaningful outcome (Abdul-Rahim & Yong 
2008; Yong 2007). IPOs issued under REITS category are 
also excluded due to the differing format of financial 
statement presentation. Based upon these selection criteria, 
the present study examines a final sample384 IPOs.
TABLE 1. Distribution of IPOs population and sample by year of listing, 1999 to 2008
Listing Year ‘99 ‘00 ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 ‘04 ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 Total
IPO population 19 38 20 51 58 72 79 40 26 23 426
Dropped cases 0 5 4 6 3 2 7 6 4 5 42
Sample IPOs  19 33 16 45 55 70 72 34 22 18 384
Shariah IPOs 14 32 15 41 50 66 63 31 20 15 347
Non-Shariah IPOs 5 1 1 4 5 4 9 3 2 3 37
Matched Sample IPOs 5 1 1 4 5 4 9 3 2 3 37
Note: The percentage of IPOs that are Shariah-compliant is consistent with the percentage of PLCs with Shariah-compliant status (Figure 1).
The main objective of the present study is to test 
whether the performance of Shariah IPOs differs from 
that of the non-Shariah IPOs. As noted above, similar 
studies by Abdul-Rahim and Yong (2008, 2010) find no 
difference between Shariah and non-Shariah IPOs. The 
present study expands upon the works of Abdul-Rahim 
& Yong (2008, 2010) by examining whether or not the 
lack of difference is due to the incompatibility of the 
groups being compared. Table 1 demonstrates that the 
total number of Shariah IPOs is nearly 10 times greater than 
non-Shariah IPOs. Therefore, the present study proposes 
that the difference between Shariah and non-Shariah 
IPOs can be examined more appropriately by creating a 
matched sample of Shariah IPOs that is of equal size and 
shares similar characteristics with those of non-Shariah 
IPOs. The characteristics used to select and construct the 
matched sample of 37 Shariah IPOs are as follows: (i) the 
year of the IPO issuance; (ii) the board on which the IPOs 
are seeking listing; (iii) the sector of the issuing firm’s 
core business; (iv) the offer size of the IPOs; and (v) the 
operating risk of the IPOs. 
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Data for this study are gathered from various sources, 
including OSIRIS; Investors Digest (one of Bursa Malaysia 
publications terminated in mid-2004); the websites of 
Bursa Malaysia and the Malaysian Issuing House (MIH); 
the prospectuses of the IPOs; and the annual reports of the 
issuing firms.
INITIAL PERFORMANCE
The initial performance of IPOs, which is the variable to 
be explained in this study, is measured using the initial 
returns of the IPOs. The two methods most commonly used 
for calculating initial returns are based upon the opening 
price on the first day of trading; and the closing price on 
the first day of trading (e.g., Agarwal et al. 2008; Ritter 
1998; Dawson 1987; Yong 1991). To conserve space, the 
present study employs only the formulation based upon 
opening price. The preference for opening price over 
closing price is based upon the argument that the price that 
prevails at the opening of the listing day is subject toless 
trading noises than the price that prevails at the closing 
of the listing day. The formulation for the initial return 
(IPORTN) is as follows:
1 100
OPEN
i
i OFFER
i
P
IPORTN
P
 = − × 
   
(1)
where POPENi is the opening price on the listing day and 
POFFERi is the offer price of the ith IPO.
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
When examining the factors that explain the initial returns 
of Shariah versus non-Shariah IPOs, the present study 
focuses on eight explanatory factors:allocation rate; 
operating risk; growth motive; firm size; firm age; offer 
size; underwriter reputation; and market condition. 
Allocation rate (ALLOCT), which is adopted from 
Amihud et al. (2003), is calculated as follows:
1
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where α is 0.5/N; Nis the sample size; and OSR is the 
oversubscription ratio, which represents the ratio of 
units subscribed to units offered. ALLOCT represents the 
allocation rate that the subscribers are likely to receive of 
their order on an IPO. Item α is added in Equation (2) so 
that ALLOCT must be positive, but is, at most, equal to 1 (0 
< ALLOCT ≤ 1.0). Note that if ALLOCT equals 1, the investors 
are allocated with all the IPOs for which they subscribe. As 
explained by Amihud et al. (2003), undersubscribed IPOs 
will be absorbed by underwriters or else the IPO fails. In 
the sample of IPOs examined in the present, 6 such cases of 
IPOs that fail to get full subscription exist and the ALLOCT 
values for these IPOs are accordingly equal to 1.0. 
The growth motive (GROWTH) of the IPOs is measured 
as the percentage of proceeds utilized for growth activities, 
including allocation for working capital; R&D expenditure; 
and capital expenditure.Operating risk (OPERISK) is 
measured using the standard deviation of EBITDA over the 
three years prior to the IPO, as represented in the following 
formulation:
( )
1
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The firm’s size (COSIZE) is measured based upon 
total assets, which is transformed into the natural log to 
standardize the data. Meanwhile, the offer size (OFSIZE) is 
measured by multiplying the number of shares offered by 
the offer price (NOSIxPOFFER) and then transformed using 
the natural log. The firm’s age (AGE) is defined as the 
number of years that the issuing companies have been in 
business (i.e., from the incorporation of the firm through 
the listing year of the firm’s IPOs). Ownership structure, 
specifically concentrated ownership,is defined as the 
total ownership of the top five shareholders of the issuing 
companies (OWNER5), which is calculated as follows:
5
1
s  i
s 
i
i
shares
NOSH
OWNER5 =
∑ ,
= 
 
(4)
where sharess,i = number of shares of major shareholder 
s = 1,…, 5 of the ith firm; and NOSHi = total number of 
shares outstanding.
The reputation of underwriter (DUNDWTR) takes a 
value of 1 if the main underwriter of the IPO is one of 
the five ‘reputable’ underwriters and 0 if otherwise. The 
present study uses Bursa Malaysia’s list of reputable 
investment bankers in 2007 and 2008 to identify 
reputable underwriters, which includes CIMB Investment 
Bank Berhad; HWANGDBS Investment Bank Berhad; 
AMINVESTMENT Bank Berhad; KENANGA Investment Bank 
Berhad; and OSK Investment Bank Berhad. 
Market condition is also represented by a dummy 
variable (DMKT),which takes a value of 1 if the market is 
in “hot” condition and 0 if otherwise. The present study 
follows Afirudin (2004) in defining a hot market as one 
when the volume of offering and number of new listings 
are high. For this study period, the market condition during 
a 4-year period(i.e., from 2002 to 2005) is considered hot, 
while the market is cold during the remaining 6 years 
(1999 to 2001; and 2006 to 2008).
MODEL SPECIFICATION
The econometric equation that represents the regression 
ofinitial returns on allocation rate, growth motive, 
operating risk and the six control variables defined in the 
earlier section is represented as follows:
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IPORTNi = α + β1ALLOCTi + β2OPERISKi
 + β3 GROWTHi + βJ
1
J
j  
∑
=
CVj, i + εi         
(5)
where α = constant term,
 β = coefficient estimates of the respective 
explanatory variables, 
 IPORTNi = initial return of the ith IPO,
 ALLOCT = allocation rate,
 CV = controlled variables,
 j = AGE, COSIZE, OFSIZE, DUNDWTR, 
OWNER5, and DMKT,
 AGE = age (in years) of the IPO firm at the 
time of the IPO,
 COSIZE = size of the IPO firm,
 GROWTH = growth motive behind the IPO 
issuance,
 OFFSIZE = size of the IPO issue,
 DUNDEWTR = dummy variable for underwriter 
reputation,
 OWNSHIP = ownership of the top 5 shareholders 
of the IPO firm, 
 DMKT = dummy var iable  for  market 
condition, 
 OPERISK = operating risk, and
 ε = error term.
Equation (5) is run using cross-sectional multiple 
regressions. Before reporting the regression results, 
econometric issues, such as multicollinearity, 
autocorrelation, and heteroskedasticity, are tested and 
corrected (if any) to ensure the estimated coefficients are 
reliable to provide a basis for meaningful interpretation.
RESULTS OF THE STUDY
Table 2 summarizes the profiles of the 384 selected IPOs 
that are issued and listed between January 1999 and 
December 2008. The Shariah IPOs are offered at a price that 
is approximately 20 percent lower than the non-Shariah 
IPOs. Relative to the non-Shariah IPOs, the Shariah IPOs 
are also trading at lower opening and closing prices on the 
day of listing. Furthermore, the gaps between the opening 
and closing prices for Shariah IPOs are found to be greater 
than for non-Shariah IPOs, indicating that investors have 
more divergent opinions concerning the value of Shariah 
IPOs than the value of non-Shariah IPOs.
A higher oversubscription ratio (OSR) for the Shariah 
IPOs indicates that these IPOs are more demanded relative 
to the non-Shariah IPOs. This finding is consistent with 
the argument that Shariah IPOs are gaining popularity 
compared to their non-Shariah counterparts. Muslim 
investors may contribute to the higher demand for Shariah 
IPOs since such investors are typically more attracted to 
investments that comply with Shariah rules. The higher 
OSR could also be attributed to the smaller supply of 
Shariah IPOs. Note that the offer size of the Shariah IPOs 
(RM49,087,003) is, on average, much smaller than that of 
the non-Shariah IPOs (RM130,559,047). In other words, the 
demand for IPOs is similar in both Shariah and non-Shariah 
IPOs (constant numerator), but the OSR of Shariah IPOs is 
higher due to the smaller supply of such IPOs (smaller 
denominator). 
Of the total proceeds that are raised from the IPOs, 
only slightly more than half (57%) are allocated for growth 
purposes. This finding is consistent with Jelic et al. (2001), 
who find that only 56 percent of companies allocate 
proceeds from IPOs to growth or expansion activities. Jelic 
et al. (2001) use a sample of 182 Malaysian IPOs listed 
on the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia between 1980 and 
1995. Shariah IPO issuers, especially the matched Shariah 
IPO issuers respectively allocate 62 percent and 73 percent 
for growth purposes. The aforementioned percentages 
are high in relation to the non-Shariah IPO issuers, which 
only allocate 42 percent of IPO proceeds for the growth 
purposes. 
TABLE 2. Profiles of Malaysian IPOs, 1999-2008
     Items Whole Shariah Non-Shariah Matched Shariah
Offer Price (RM) 1.11 1.08 1.34  1.37
Opening Price (RM) 1.44 1.41 1.70 1.65
Closing Price (RM) 1.42 1.40 1.66 1.65
Over-Subscription Ratio (times) 31.40 32.50 21.16 25.32
IPOs with Reputable Underwriter 52.34% 51.87% 56.76% 48.65%
Offer Size (RM’000) 56,937.17 49,087.00 130,559.05 159557.38
Total  Proceeds (RM’000)  39,360.35 32,617.36 102,598.63 76402.07
Proceeds For Growth (RM]000)  22,428.05 20,208.76 43,241.43 56095.34
Proceeds to Offer Size (%) 69.13 66.45 78.58 47.88
Growth to Proceeds (%) 56.98 61.96 42.15 73.42
Total Asset (RM’000) 218,378.55 194,576.46 441,603.61 496,180.03
Average EBITDA (RM’000)a 19,184.39 18,256.59 27,885.69 31,800.12
Standard Deviation of EBITDA 18,604.19 19,409.65 7,825.73 10,382.09
Firm’s Age (Year) 4.70 4.57 5.92 5.81
Top 5 Ownership (%) 59.21 59.21 59.29 64.72
Number of IPOs, N 384 37 347 37
Note: a The average values are calculated over a three-year period prior to listing. 
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Non-Shariah IPOs are larger than Shariah IPOs 
in regards to total assets and offer size by 2.27 times 
and 2.66 times, respectively. The differences reduce 
significantly when Shariah IPOs are represented by the 
matched Shariah sample. Nonetheless, investors of 
Shariah IPOs should probably be concerned with the 
lower profitability (EBITDA) and more so with the nearly 
3 times greater variability of EBITDA compared to those 
reported by non-Shariah firms. Again, the differences 
between Shariah and non-Shariah IPOs reduce substantially 
once the comparison is performed in a more compatible 
manner (i.e., by comparison against the matched Shariah 
sample).Little difference is found between the IPO firms in 
relation to age and ownership concentration, although the 
results concerning the latter indicates that the ownerships 
of Malaysian firms are highly concentrated (OWNER5 ∼ 
60%) to five major shareholders.
INITIAL RETURNS OF SHARIAH VERSUS 
NON-SHARIAH IPOS
Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics of the IPO initial 
returns over the 10-year study period for the whole sample, 
which includes Shariah IPOs; non-Shariah IPOs; and 
matched Shariah of IPOs. The initial returns,based upon 
closing price, are also reported for reference purposes. On 
average, the initial return for the whole sample of 384 IPOs 
is 31.65 percent. Previous studies (e.g., Dawson 1987; 
Yong 1991; Ku Ismail et al. 1993) on Malaysian IPOs report 
initial returns that are consistently higher than 100 percent 
for earlier periods, which span from 1978 until 1989. In 
later periods, from 1990 to 1995, Yong et al. (2001) report 
an average initial return of 81 percent. The declining trend 
of initial returns of Malaysian IPOs continues in more 
recent years. For instance, for the period from 1999 to 
2007, initial returns decline to 32 percent (Abdul-Rahim 
& Yong 2008), which is also consistent with the findings 
reported concerning IPOs in the present study. 
TABLE 3. Descriptive statistics of IPO initial returns
Statistics Whole Shariah Non-Shariah Matched Shariah
 IROPEN IRCLOSE IROPEN IRCLOSE IROPEN IRCLOSE IROPEN IRCLOSE
Mean 31.65 30.21 32.17 30.77 26.76 24.87 21.07 19.44
Median 20 18.13 20 18.46 18.67 17.8 10 9.68
Minimum -68.13 -70.7 -67.27 -66.67 -68.13 -70.7 -16.28 -29.09
Maximum 275 263.64 275 263.64 190 184 102.7 150
Std.Dev. 43.27 48.92 43.2 49.41 44.22 44.28 28.81 32.76
Skewness 1.51 1.72 1.5 1.74 1.61 1.4 1.17 1.97
Kurtosis 6.96 7.32 6.93 7.29 7.4 7.06 3.57 8.15
J-Bera 396.48 488.50 353.76 440.09 45.74 37.49 8.94 64.77
Test of Difference
Category   t-test MW   t-test MW
Non-Shariah   0.722 5952.5   -0.656 617
   (0.471)  (0.467)    (0.514)  (0.465)
Notes: Jarque-Bera statistics are all significant at the 1% level, indicating that the initial returns of the sample IPOs are not normally distributed. 
Non-normal distribution is, however, considered a stylized fact for financial data (Bali & Cakici 2004). MW refers to non-parametric Mann-
Whitney U test. In tests of differences, figures in parenthesis represent the p-value. Tests of differences are done on IROPEN only.
The Shariah IPOs report initial returns (32.2%) that 
are very similar to the whole sample. This finding is 
somewhat expected because most (about 90%) of the 
IPOs carry Shariah status. The results concerningthe initial 
returns of Shariah IPOs in the present study is consistent 
with that documented in Abdul-Rahim and Yong (2008, 
2010). The initial returns of Shariah IPOs are higher than 
that of the non-Shariah group (26.8%), although the 
standard deviations of these initial returns are similar. 
However, when the characteristics of the sub-samples 
are considered by comparing the non-Shariah IPOs with 
the Shariah matched IPOs, the non-Shariah IPOs appear 
to perform better. However, the standard deviation of the 
initial returns is much smaller for the matched Shariah 
than non-Shariah IPOs. Overall, the results indicate that 
although the initial returns for matched Shariah IPOs are 
slightly lower, the variations among IPOs are smaller, 
which allows the performances of these IPOs to be more 
easily predicted. However, despite the seemingly different 
initial returns between Shariah (all and matched sample) 
and non-Shariah IPOs, the results of the independent 
t-test and Mann-Whitney U test in Table 4 consistently 
demonstrate that no statistical differences exist between 
the two IPO groups. 
The pattern of yearly initial returns, which are based 
upon offer-to-open prices, is illustrated in Figure 2. For 
the whole sample, the highest average initial returns are 
reported in 2000 (63.3 percent). Good performance is also 
reported in 2003 and 2004, with reported initial returns of 
45.6 percent and 40.9 percent, respectively. Shariah IPOs 
also report the highest average initial returns during these 
periods: 64.2 percent in 2000; 47.1 percent in 2003; and 
38.5 percent in 2004. This similarity can also be linked to 
the composition of Malaysian IPOs, where most firms are 
Shariah compliant. Non-Shariah IPOs are slightly different 
in regards to their bullish years. The highest initial returns 
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are reported in 2004 (80.42%), followed by 52.78 percent 
in 2002. The matched Shariah IPOs show a hybrid feature 
between the non-Shariah and the Shariah IPOs in general. 
Like non-Shariah IPOs, the matched Shariah IPOs report 
the highest initial return reported in 2004, but report the 
second highest initial returns in 2003 in a fashion similar 
to Shariah IPOs generally. Interestingly, the results for the 
matched sample suggest that Shariah IPOs that have similar 
characteristics to non-Shariah IPOs do not appear to offer 
initial returns which are similar to either their non-Shariah 
counterparts or the remaining Shariah IPOs.
DOES SHARIAH STATUS INFLUENCE IPO INITIAL RETURNS?
Before proceeding to the analysis concerning determinants 
of initial returns, the present study performs a cross-
sectional multiple regression analysis, which adds a 
dummy variable (DSHARIAH) representing IPOs with 
Shariah status in Equation (5). The results are expected 
to strengthen those of the difference tests, which may 
not be powerful enough to address such an important 
issue because the tests do not consider the influence of 
other variables. This additional analysis is also important 
because it allows the present study to re-examine a 
question that remains unanswered by the examinations 
performed by Abdul-Rahim and Yong (2008, 2010), 
who claim Shariah status plays no particular role in the 
Malaysian IPO market because it does not alter the patterns 
in the initial returns of new shares despite the emphasis on 
the Shariah investment. The results of the present analysis, 
as reported in Table 4, show that the DSHARIAH is positive, 
but insignificant, in influencing initial returns.Results 
concerning other determinants, which will be discussed in 
later section, are also not influenced by the incorporation 
of DSHARIAH in the model. These results lend strong 
support to the aforementioned claim by Abdul-Rahim and 
Yong (2008, 2010).
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FIGURE 2. Trend of IPO initial returns, 1999-2008
TABLE 4. Results of regression on the whole IPO sample with and without the Shariah dummy variable
 
Variables
 Without DSHARIAH With DSHARIAH
  Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics
 ALLOCTj -26.3144 -4.4790*** -26.2991 -4.4858***
 GROWTH 2.9402 0.4150 2.8626 0.3974
 OPERISK -0.8168 -0.4614 -0.8413 -0.4706
 DSHARIAH   1.2816 0.17133
 Control Variables (CV) OFERSIZE -7.6350 -2.3183** -7.6034 -2.3071**
 AGE 4.5770 2.1189** 4.5970 2.1182**
 COSIZE 2.8512 0.7471 2.8934 0.7519
 OWNER5 -0.3081 -1.9173* -0.3086 -1.9065*
 DWRITER -4.4301 -1.0720 -4.3994 -1.0549
 DMKT -0.5699 -0.0856 -0.6121 -0.0915
 INTERCEPT 116.7600 3.1543*** 114.8650 2.9765***
 Adjusted R-Squared 0.1491  0.1469 
 F-Statistics 8.4555***  7.5936*** 
 Probability 0.000  0.000 
 Durbin-Watson stat. 1.4465  1.4464 
 VIF range 1.033-3.699  1.033-3.715
Notes: Autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity are determined through the Breusch-Godfrey Langrange multiplier test and 
corrected with a Newey-West Covariance estimator. The adjusted values are highlighted by symbol #. *, ** and *** 
denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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RESULTS OF CORRELATION ANALYSIS
The correlations in Table 5 provide the pairwise 
relationships between initial returns and each of the 
explanatory variables. The relationships between 
independent variables, in the meantime, can be used to 
detect multicollinearity problems that may affect the 
regression results, but the results are not reported here 
to conserve space. As later confirmed with the variance 
inflation factor (VIF) values, none of the independent 
variables are correlated at levels that indicate the existence 
of multicollinearity problems in the regression models. 
The correlations indicated by the results presented in Table 
5suggest that the initial returns of non-Shariah, Shariah 
and matched Shariah IPOs are each related to a different 
set of variables. The variables that are significantly 
related to the initial returns of the whole sample and 
Shariah IPOs are allocation rate (ALLOCT); operating 
risk (OPERISK); the size of the IPO offer (OFSIZE); firm 
age (AGE); firm size (COSIZE); and ownership structure 
(OWNER5). The similarities between the relationships in 
the whole sample and Shariah IPOs are more likely due 
to the fact that the majority of newly listed companies 
hold Shariah status (∼90%). This set of variables is 
almost completely different from the set of variables for 
non-Shariah compliant IPOs. The initial returns of non-
Shariah IPOs are significantly correlated to allocation rate 
(ALLOCT) and market condition (DMKT). Meanwhile, the 
initial returns of the matched Shariah IPOs are significantly 
correlated to allocation rate (ALLOCT) and the size of the 
IPO offer (OFSIZE). Overall, regardless of categorizations, 
only allocation rate (ALLOCT) is consistently significantly 
correlated to initial returns. The negative correlation 
between ALLOCT and initial returns can be taken as 
preliminary support for the winner’s curse hypothesis. 
The hypothesis suggests that when the allocation rate is 
high, IPOs are typically overpriced and allocation is high 
because institutional investors are more likely to avoid 
these IPOs. Not having the same information as informed 
investors, uninformed investors place their subscriptions 
and win the allocations. When the new issues start trading, 
the fair price is revealed and turns out to be lower than the 
offer price. To summarize, the higher the allocation rate, 
the lower the initial returns.
TABLE 5. Correlations between initial returns and explanatory variables
  Variables
 
Whole
 Non-Shariah Shariah 
Matched Sample  Initial Returns (IPORTNOPEN)
IPORTNCLOSE 0.8149** 0.9016** 0.8070** 0.7574**
ALLOCT -0.3563** -0.4618** -0.3437** -0.5635**
GROWTH 0.027 -0.0078 0.0293 0.0453
OPERISK -0.1197** -0.004 -0.1314* -0.1232
OFSIZE -0.1888** -0.0864 -0.2016** -0.3657*
AGE 0.0973* 0.0481 0.1069* 0.0097
COSIZE -0.1285** -0.0104 -0.1394** -0.2946
OWNER5 -0.1289** 0.036 -0.1466** -0.0229
DWRITER -0.0621 -0.0174 -0.0658 0.2098
DMKT 0.0069 0.3651* -0.0137 0.174
Notes: Asterisks ** and * denote correlations that aresignificant at the 0.01 level and 0.05 level (2-tailed), respectively.
DETERMINANTS OF IPO INITIAL RETURNS
The second part of the present study focuses on the 
determinants of the initial returns of the Shariah IPOs, 
which are analyzed by running the cross-sectional 
multiple regression analyses of Equation (5). Before the 
regression results are discussed, it is important to report 
that the variance inflation factors (VIF) of each variable in 
the regression analyses are always lower than 10, which 
indicates that the results can be considered free from 
multicollinearity problems (Kleinbaum et al. 1998). The 
results of the Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange Multiplier tests 
for identifying autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity 
problems in each model are also reported. Whenever 
the standard regression analyses detect the presence of 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity issues, the problems 
are treated with the Newey–West covariance estimator so 
that the regression results are more precise in estimating 
the coefficients. 
Within the scope of determinants examined in this 
study, the results in Table 6 may be summarized as follows. 
The initial returns of non-Shariah IPOs are significantly 
explained by ALLOCT, DWRITER and DMKT. The initial 
returns of Shariah IPOs are also explained by ALLOCT, but 
that is the only similarity between the two groups.Unlike 
the initial returns of non-Shariah IPOs, the initial returns 
of the Shariah IPOs are also explained by OFSIZE, AGE 
and OWNER5. Based upon the results thus far, this study 
finds evidence that supports the findings of Abdul-Rahim 
and Yong (2008, 2010) that the initial returns of IPOs are 
not influenced by Shariah status. However, the findings 
of present study go further and determine that the initial 
returns of Shariah and non-Shariah IPOs are apparently 
influenced by a different set of factors with only one 
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common variable (ALLOCT). A possible explanation for 
the difference is that the previous studies (Abdul-Rahim & 
Yong 2008, 2010) do not incorporate some of the variables 
considered in the present study. Next, in confirming 
whether or not the difference in the determinant factors 
ofinitial returns between the two groups are influenced by 
the differences in the characteristics of the issuing firms, 
the results for the matched sample of Shariah IPOs are 
examined. The results confirm earlier findings regarding 
the role of ALLOCT as the sole common factor in the two 
groups of IPOs. ALLOCT is the only determinant of initial 
returns among the matched Shariah IPOs.
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
The present study examines a sample of 384 IPOs that 
are issued and listed on Bursa Malaysia during a period 
spanning from January 1999 to December 2008. The 
sample IPOs are segregated according to their Shariah 
compliance status. Since Shariah IPOs constitute the 
majority of the IPOs in the Malaysian market, a comparison 
with the non-Shariah IPOs might not be compatible. 
Accordingly, a matched sample of Shariah IPOs that 
contains the same number of IPOs and share similar 
characteristics with the non-Shariah IPOs is created. The 
comparison between non-Shariah IPOs and Shariah IPOs 
(all or matched sample) yield results that demonstrate 
these groups share only one common factor (i.e., ALLOCT). 
Therefore, it may be surmised that the two groups are 
determined by different factors. The results suggest that 
the initial returns of non-Shariah IPOs are also determined 
by the reputation of the underwriter and the condition 
of the market. On the contrary, the initial returns of the 
Shariah IPOs (all) depends on the size of the offer; the 
age of the issuer; and the total ownership of the top five 
shareholders. As far as the result of the matched Shariah 
sample is concerned, none of the other variables are 
significant in explaining the initial returns.
Overall, allocation rate (ALLOCT) is the only factor 
that consistently matters in predicting initial returns of 
IPOs. The negative impact of ALLOCT on the initial returns 
of IPOs, regardless of Shariah status, suggests that IPOs 
that are lowly demanded, and fully award investors’ 
subscriptions as a result, have a greater tendency to 
offer lower initial returns. As suggested by Amihud et al. 
(2003), the negative ALLOCT-initial returns relationship 
indicates the existence of winner’s curse in the Malaysian 
TABLE 6. Results of multiple regression analyses on whole sample and sub-samples of IPOs
   Variables Whole Shariah Non-Shariah Matched Shariah
ALLOCT -26.3144 -24.7268 -38.5908 -31.2333
 (-4.4790) *** (-3.8843)*** (-2.55688)** (-2.6114)**
GROWTH 2.9402 4.9684 8.3863 7.4969
 (0.4150) (0.6344) (0.3754) (0.4628)
OPERISK -0.8168 -0.4952 -1.3374 -1.1927
 (-0.4614) (-0.2452) (-0.1922) (-0.2778)
Control Variables
OFSIZE -7.6350 -7.8452 -7.2944 -10.9028
 (-2.3183) ** (-2.0771)** (-0.5864) (-1.4507)
AGE 4.5770 5.2606 4.6918 4.9352
 (2.1189)** (2.0505)** (0.5643) (1.0310)
COSIZE 2.8512 1.6781 10.3459 7.9832
 (0.7471) (0.4243) (0.8032) (1.1028)
OWNER5 -0.3081 -0.3750 0.5643 -0.5414
 (-1.9173) * (-2.1390)** (0.7549) (-1.0643)
DWRITER -4.4301 -3.3945 -35.6577 5.8916
 (-1.0720) (-0.8268) (-2.0762)** (0.5801)
DMKT -0.5699 -2.1074 34.8151 -1.7789
 (-0.0856) (-0.3080) (2.0024)** (-0.1470)
INTERCEPT 116.7600 135.6579 -48.1682 110.4845
 (3.1543) *** (3.0744)*** (-0.3938) (1.2895)
Adjusted R-Squared 0.1491 0.1470 0.1950 0.2117
F-Statistics  8.4555*** 7.6261*** 1.9691* 2.0744*
Probability 0.000 0.000 0.0839 0.0691
Durbin-Watson stat. 1.4465 1.4607 2.2947 1.5121
VIF range 1.033-3.699 1.030-3.420 1.377-6.754 1.204-5.696
Notes: Autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in the analysis are identified through the Breusch-Godfrey Langrange multiplier 
test and corrected with a Newey-West covariance estimator. The adjusted values are highlighted by symbol #. ***, 
** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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IPO market, which is consistent with the findings of Yong 
(2009). The higher the allocation rate of the IPOs that the 
investors (especially uninformed investors) win, the more 
likely that they win cursed IPOs (i.e., IPOs that provide 
lower initial returns). In other words, the uninformed 
investors are cursed because they win IPOs that are 
overpriced.
The results of the present study are expected to 
guide investors and market regulators in formulating 
their respective strategies. Once the distinctive features 
of Shariah versus non-Shariah IPOs are established, 
investors and fund managers should be more confident 
and receptive to factors that are statistically proven to 
exert significant influence over the initial returns of 
the IPOs. The results of the present study reveal that the 
initial returns of Shariah IPOs are influenced by different 
factors than those that influence the initial returns of non-
Shariah IPOs. Muslim investors should pay more attention 
to internal factors, particularly the size of the offer; the 
age of the company; and the ownership concentration of 
the company. Meanwhile, investors of non-Shariah IPOs 
should pay closer attention to external factors, such as 
the reputation of the lead underwriter and the condition 
of the market. 
Regardless of the Shariah status of the IPOs, investors 
must be wary of the allocation rate of the IPOs. The higher 
the allocation that one receives, the greater the chance of 
receiving an overpriced IPO. The findings provide evidence 
of winner’s curse, which implies that the Malaysian 
IPO market continues to experience high information 
asymmetry.The winner’s curse phenomenon is somewhat 
alarming because it appears to be driven by the speculative 
behavior of investors who enter the IPO market and exit at 
the first available opportunity. This behavior is reflected by 
the fact that investors are not paying attention to company 
fundamentals that are disclosed in the prospectus (Daily et 
al. 2005). Investors are neither influenced by the manner in 
which companies use IPO proceeds, nor are they influenced 
by how the companies have performed in the past. 
The market regulator might interpret the indifference 
in the initial performances of Shariah versus non-Shariah 
IPOs as implying a lacking in the Shariah screening criteria 
adopted by the SAC. As detailed in the Appendix, the 
SAC places great emphasis on the permissibility (halal 
or haram) of the businesses of the companies, while 
somewhat neglecting the other elements of Islamic 
investment, such as gharar (uncertainty) and maisir 
(gambling). International Shariah equity screening 
standards, particularly those of the Council of Islamic 
Fiqhi Association, evaluate the companies’ financial 
management. Two of the prudent financial management 
measurements are debt ratio and accounts receivable over 
total asset ratio (ARTA ratio). In capital structure literature, 
the gearing ratio is commonly associated with the riskiness 
of the companies, while the ARTA ratio measures the extent 
to which the assets owned by companies actually exist and 
are available to investors.
The present study also proposes that the indifference 
in the initial returns of the Shariah versus non-Shariah 
IPOs is due to the manner the SAC publishes the Shariah-
compliant status under a blanket (i.e., without awarding 
any specific rating based upon how well the companies 
comply with the screening criteria). The blanket labeling 
is less informative because nearly all Malaysian listed 
companies (Figure 1) have attained Shariah-compliant 
status. As an analogy, without any specific rating (AAA, 
BB and etc.) given to bond instruments, investors have 
difficulty in differentiating the riskiness and credibility 
of one bond in relation to another. Therefore, the present 
study proposes that the specific characteristics of Shariah-
compliant stocks need to be examined to determine the 
rating of the stocks based upon the degree of compliance 
with Shariah rules. A similar proposition has been 
forwarded by Mohamad Akram (2006), the former 
Executive Director of International Shariah Research 
Academy for Islamic Finance (ISRA), who stresses the 
need to examine the Shariah-compliant companies not 
only based upon their income, but also based upon their 
total debt; cash and interest bearing securities; and account 
receivables.
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ENDNOTES
1 The development of the Malaysian Islamic equity market 
began with the establishment of an informal group called the 
Islamic Instruments Study Group (IISG) by the SC in 1994, 
whose main function is to advise market participants on 
matters pertaining to issues in the Islamic capital market. 
On 16 May 1996, the SC established the Shariah Advisory 
Council (SAC), which is comprised of panels consisting 
of muftis, Islamic finance experts, Islamic scholars and 
scholars of various disciplines. One of the functions of the 
SAC is to formulate the screening criteria for assessing and 
awarding Shariah compliance status to financial instruments 
that are registered with the SC.
2 The paper is last updated on December 22, 2011.
3 The signaling model applies when asymmetric information 
exists between investors (outsiders) and the issuers 
(insiders). Any action taken by the issuers, including 
financial decisions, will be translated into a certain signal 
which the investors rely upon to predict the company’s 
performance.
4 Faddish behavior refers to an overreaction by investors that 
leads to an overvaluation in early aftermarket trading. 
5 A cascade in the IPO market is a situation where potential 
investors ignore their private information, but instead 
imitate earlier investors in making purchasing decisions. 
The cascade effect is also known as the bandwagon 
effect.
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6 In 1976, the government of Malaysia implemented a public 
policy requiring at least 30 percent of IPO share ownership 
distribution to be reserved for Bumiputra (the indigenous 
population). The minimum Bumiputra ownership 
requirement can be fulfilled via ownership of companies; 
mutual funds; or on an individual investor basis. Abdullah 
and Mohd (2004) examine the Bumiputra ownership policy 
as a potential factor that influences the performance of 
Malaysian IPOs. In contrast to the argument put forth by 
Moshirian et al. (2009) and the empirical evidence by Ariff 
and Shamser (1999), the findings of Abdullah and Mohd 
(2004) reveal that Bumiputra ownership allocation reduces 
underpricing.
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APPENDIX
SCREENING CRITERIA OF THE SHARIAH ADVISORY 
COUNCIL
The Shariah screening process of the ShariahAdvisory 
Council (SAC) of the Securities Commission (SC) places 
emphasis on the main activities and the sources of income 
of the listed companies. The SC collects information on the 
position of the companies from various sources, such as 
the companies’ annual financial reports and their responses 
to the SC’s standard survey forms. The SC can also 
request additional information and data directly from the 
respective companies. The SAC applies standard criteria, 
which focus upon the activities of the companies applying 
for the Shariah-compliant status. The SAC will not grant the 
Shariah-compliant status to companies that are involved 
in the following prohibited (haram) activities1:
a. Financial services based on interest (riba);
b. Gambling;
c. Manufacture or sale of non-halal products or related 
products;
d. Conventional insurance;
e. Entertainment activities which are not permissible 
according to the Shariah;
f. Manufacture or sale of tobacco-based products or 
related products;
g. Stock broking or share trading in non-Shariah 
compliant securities; and
h. Other activities considered non-permissible according 
to Shariah. 
 However, as reported in the Resolutions of the Shariah 
Advisory Council (SAC) of the Securities Commission on 
21 August 1996, the SAC agreed to also consider mixed 
business companies (i.e., companies whose business 
activities include both permissible and prohibited 
elements) to be eligible for the Shariah-compliant status. 
As finally outlined in the SAC guidelines on 27 August 
1997, the additional criteria for screening mixed business 
companies require the following pre-requisites:
a. The core activities of the company must not be against 
Shariah principles concerning the benevolent public 
perception or image of the company.
b. The core activities of the company must provide 
benefit to the Muslim ummah (community), while the 
non-permissible elements of business must constitute 
a small portion of the company’s overall activities; 
and involve transactions that are difficult to avoid 
(ummumbalwa) or involve custom (uruf) and the 
rights of the non-Muslim community that are accepted 
by Islam.
Later on, on 22 July 2002, the SAC outlined the 
specific quantitative criteria, which are more definite and 
objective for determining the extent of impure activities 
and the resulting incomes that are considered tolerable 
for awarding Shariah-compliant status to mixed business 
companies. As depicted in Figure A, the additional criteria 
are specified in four benchmarks that applicant companies 
must adhere with in accounting for the non-permissible 
(non-approved) elements in their businesses.
1 Securities Commission website http://www.sc.com.
Turnover (TO)  and profit before 
tax (PBT) of non-approved 
activities
Statement of Position (SOP) of 
non approved activities
Interest income
Dividend received from 
investment in non-approved 
securities                              
TO and PBT of non-permissible 
activities vs group’s TO and PBT
SOP of non-permissible activities
vs group’s PBT
Interest income vs group’s TO
Dividend received from  
investment  in non-approved 
securities vs group’s PBT
5 percent - contribution from clearly prohibited activities 
such as interest, pork, gambling and even manufacturing of 
condoms. 
10 percent - contribution from activities of umum balwa 
like interest from conventional banks or revenue from 
tabacco-related products.
20 percent - contribution from rental payment from premise 
for gambling and liqour selling.
25 percent - contribution from activties that are generally 
halal and umum balwa but tainted with other prohibited 
elements such as in hoteling, brokerage houses and airlines.
CONSOLIDATED 
INFORMATION ON
TO AND PBT 
CONTRIBUTION
COMPARISON
AGAINST BENCHMARK
Notes: Non-approved securities are securities that do not comply with Shariah rules.
Sources: Resolutions of the Securities Commission Shariah Advisory Council (http://www.mifc.com/sift_09/content/othpub/8ICMbook2(6).pdf)
 Mohamad Akram (2006)
FIGURE A. SAC’s quantitative screening criteria for mixed business companies
It is also important to note that the SAC reserves the 
right to evaluate the mixed companies based on their 
image (i.e., how these companies are perceived by others) 
in a separate qualitative evaluation in cases that involve 
companies that are notorious for engaging in the following 
activities: (i) serving alcoholic drinks in public transport; 
(ii) running a pork-based business; (iii) selling alcoholic 
drinks in restaurants; (iv) takeovers of casino companies; (v) 
advertising alcoholic drinks; and (vi) holding equity interest 
in other listed companies that are notShariah-compliant.
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